Oil Prices, aggregate economic activity and global liquidity conditions: evidence from Turkey by C. Emre Alper & Orhan Torul
Oil Prices, aggregate economic activity and global liquidity
conditions: evidence from Turkey 
C. Emre Alper Orhan Torul
Bogazici University Bogazici University
Abstract
When compared to the previous literature which analyzes oil price changes and real
economic activity for countries influencing world demand and/or supply, this study is first of
its kind in investigating the relation within the context of a small open economy, Turkey.
Parallel to the results of Blanchard and Gali (2007) for developed economies, we first report
for Turkey that the negative response of real output to oil price increases have diminished
since the early 2000s. Other than using different versions of oil price changes and real output
growth, which are the standard variables used in the empirical literature, in our next set of
estimations we also include variables to account for global liquidity conditions. Once these
variables are incorporated, we unveil that the negative impact of oil price changes on
aggregate economic activity is significant even in the post-2000 period.
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There is a vast empirical literature on the interaction between crude oil price changes
and real economic activity. While the majority of the previous studies support the existence
of the supply-side cost e⁄ects, recent ￿ndings question the validity of a negative impact of
oil price increases on real output growth.
Hamilton (1983), in a seminal paper, ￿nds a negative and signi￿cant relationship between
real oil price changes and the U.S. GNP growth, using a multivariate VAR analysis. Mork
(1989) argues for the presence of asymmetry and documents that while oil price increases
impede real GNP growth, oil price decreases do not have any statistically signi￿cant impact.
Using a volatility-based speci￿cation, Lee, et al. (1995) verify the presence of asymmetry, and
￿nd that the e⁄ects of oil price increases in an environment with stable prices are more drastic
when compared to an environment where oil prices change frequently. Hamilton (1996), in
order to better capture the asymmetry, introduces another speci￿cation of prices based on
the increase over previous year￿ s maximum price. He argues that even after controlling for
asymmetry, the unfavorable e⁄ects of oil price changes on aggregate output growth still
persist.
Other developed economies have also been empirically investigated. For example, JimØnez-
Rodr￿guez and SÆnchez (2005) document that excluding Japan, the unfavorable e⁄ects of oil
prices are statistically valid for the sample of net oil importers, as well as an oil exporter,
the United Kingdom.
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) argue that the negative e⁄ects of oil price changes for most
of the developed economies ceased to exist in the early 2000s. They explain this phenom-
enon as being a consequence of more sound monetary policies of experienced central banks,
more ￿ exible wage contracts, smaller share of petroleum in production, and smaller and less
frequent unfavorable shocks to aggregate output other than oil prices.
This study investigates the e⁄ects of oil price changes on real output for a net oil importing
small open economy, Turkey.1 In terms of econometric modeling, Turkey di⁄ers from the
previously investigated developed economies in three aspects. First, being a small open
economy, Turkey￿ s real GDP is not expected to in￿ uence world crude oil prices. Second, as an
emerging market economy, global liquidity conditions have become an increasingly important
determinant of the growth prospects in Turkey.2 Also, as stated in the previous point, being
a small open economy, Turkey cannot a⁄ect the global liquidity conditions. Third, the
relationship between world oil prices and global liquidity conditions is ambiguous. As a
result of rising oil prices, capital account surpluses of OPEC and other major oil exporting
1According to Energy Information Administration (EIA) Online Database, in terms of oil endowments,
Turkey is not as fortunate as many other Middle Eastern countries. As of 2006, Turkey produces approxi-
mately 42,500 barrels of crude oil per day whereas the demand for consumption is around 619,000. Turkey￿ s
annual crude oil consumption constitutes 35% of her primary source of energy consumption, is slightly higher
than 3% of her GDP and corresponds to 0.73% of total world crude oil consumption. Turkey￿ s high degree
of reliance on oil as a primary source of energy and high dependency on imports underlines the strategic
importance of oil prices for the Turkish economy.
2Alper (2002) shows that for Turkey, capital in￿ ows are strongly procyclical and lead the cycle by one
quarter.
1countries could improve global liquidity conditions. On the other hand, the resultant capital
account de￿cits of oil importers will have the opposite e⁄ect. Accordingly, this study uses a
structural VAR approach to model these econometric issues utilizing monthly data on Turkey
from 1991 to 2007. We ￿rst follow the previous literature and ignore the potential e⁄ects of
global liquidity conditions. Our ￿ndings are in parallel to the results of Blanchard and Gal￿
(2007) for developed economies, and we report for Turkey that the negative response of real
output to oil price increases have diminished since the early 2000s. Other than using di⁄erent
speci￿cations for oil price changes and real output growth, which are the standard variables
used in the empirical literature, in our next set of estimations we also include variables to
account for global liquidity conditions. Once the global liquidity conditions are included
in the estimations, we unveil that the negative impact of oil price changes on aggregate
economic activity is still signi￿cant even after 2000.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the data and methodology are de-
scribed. In section 3, we present the empirical results and section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Variable De￿nitions
We ￿rst give data sources and the de￿nitions of the variables used in the estimations.
Monthly Brent crude oil prices are obtained from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics
database. We obtained real oil price series through dividing the nominal oil prices by the
deseasonalized U.S. CPI. The deseasonalized U.S. consumer price index (CPI) excluding
energy prices are obtained from the online database of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
Data on Turkish real GDP, Turkish industrial production index, overnight interest rates are
obtained from Central Bank of Turkey￿ s online database. Turkey￿ s quarterly real GDP data
are converted into monthly frequency using the monthly industrial production index following
Friedman￿ s (1962) method. Monthly domestic interest variable is obtained by averaging the
daily simple interest weighted average interbank overnight interest rate variable. The two
measures of global liquidity used are the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) and the implied volatility
of the S&P 500 index options (VIX). The FFR data are obtained from St. Louis Fed, and
the VIX data are from Chicago Board of Exchange online databases.
We ￿rst deseasonalized real oil price and Turkish real GDP variables by Census X-12
method. Next, we took the natural logarithms and then ￿rst-di⁄erenced the series. They
are found to be stationarity. VIX and interest rate variables are also found to be stationary
at levels.
We next turn to the issue of which variable would be best to use for proxying oil price
changes. We use four di⁄erent speci￿cations: oil price increase variable due to Mork (1989),
Scaled Oil Price Increase (SOPI) due to Lee et al. (1995), Net Oil Price Increase based on
the previous three years (NOPI) due to Hamilton (1996) and the simple log di⁄erence.3
3Hamilton (2003) argues that SOPI and NOPI perform better than the rest of the asymmetric price
speci￿cations in capturing the e⁄ects of oil price shocks. For a di⁄erent volatility-based speci￿cation, see
Ferderer (1996).





ot if ot > 0
0 else.
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where ot denotes log-di⁄erence of oil price.
Converting the proposed speci￿cation of Lee et al. (1995) AR(4)-GARCH(1,1) for quar-
terly into AR(12)-GARCH(1,1) for monthly data, SOPI is de￿ned as:











SOPIt = maxf0;(^ ut=^ ￿t)g (4)
Following Hamilton (1996), NOPI based on maximum price over 36 months is de￿ned as:
NOPI
36
t = maxf0;pt ￿ max(pt￿1;pt￿2;:::;pt￿36)g (5)
where pt denotes the natural logarithm of nominal oil price.
In order to estimate the e⁄ects of oil price changes, we ￿rst employed a standard bivariate
VAR with each of the real oil price variable speci￿cation and real Turkish GDP. Next,
we also incorporate global liquidity conditions and estimate multivariate structural vector
autoregressions (SVARs) with each of the real oil price speci￿cations, FFR, VIX, domestic
interest rate, and real GDP, respectively. Here the FFR and VIX variables, so called the
￿push factors￿ , are used to proxy global liquidity and the domestic interest rate variable
serves as a ￿pull factor￿ , and also captures the impact of central bank reactions to signi￿cant
oil price changes.
In the estimations, other than the endogenous variables, we included a constant and a
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for Turkey￿ s 1994 and 2001 crises, and 0 other-
wise. We determined lag-length of the bivariate VAR and SVAR models by log-likelihood
criterion. After estimating the reduced form, structural form solution is attained using the
pre-imposed restrictions on the system. Impulse-response analyses are then conducted.
3. Methodology and Estimation Results
We start by estimating a standard bivariate VAR with each of the oil price speci￿cations
and the real GDP growth for Turkey for the 1991:2-2007:10 period4. Estimation results we
4Even though data span of oil price and real output variables are larger, because domestic interest rate
variable and VIX variable are available since 1990, our estimation is constrained to the 1991:2-2007:10 period.
The log-likelihood criterion based lag length is 13 months, which is in accordance with the 4 quarterly lags of
Hamilton (1983, 1996, 2001), Hooker (1996), Mork (1989), JimØnez-Rodr￿guez and SÆnchez (2005), among
others.
3present for our initial set of estimations are for the log-di⁄erenced real oil price speci￿cation.5
Figure 1 depicts the accumulated response of Turkish real output to Brent oil price change
impulses.6 Aggregate output responds negatively albeit insigni￿cantly to oil price shocks.
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) report insigni￿cant response of real output to oil price shocks
since the 2000s. In order to see whether the response of Turkish real output to oil price shocks
is di⁄erent or not in the 2000s, we next separate the sample period into two subperiods with
respect to the year 2000 in an ad hoc manner and estimate the bivariate VARs for the two
subperiods.
The accumulated response functions presented in Figures 2 and 3 reveal that the macro-
economic impact of oil price shocks are indeed di⁄erent in the 2000s for Turkey. For the
1991:2-1999:12 period, as illustrated in Figure 2, real output is signi￿cantly and negatively
a⁄ected by rising crude oil prices. The signi￿cant and negative response of real output to
oil price increase is robust, except for the NOPI speci￿cation.7 For the 2000:1-2007:10 pe-
riod, as illustrated in Figure 3, aggregate output does not respond signi￿cantly to oil price
changes. Since we divided the sample into two in an ad hoc manner, we further investigated
the time-varying behavior of response of real GDP to real oil price. Using rolling bivariate
VAR with a window length of 107 months, we derived the three-dimensional time-varying
accumulated responses of real GDP, as illustrated in Figure 4.8 The accumulated impulse-
response graph veri￿es the gradually declining impact of oil prices on real output across time,
and con￿rms that our ￿ndings were not as a result of arbitrary sample separation, but as a
result of structural alteration at the beginning of 2000.
We next incorporate global liquidity conditions into the picture and analyze the impact
of oil prices on real output given the global liquidity conditions for a small open economy
using an SVAR model.
Suppose yt denotes the vector of all endogenous variables in the model which are the real
oil price, FFR, VIX, the domestic interest rate and the real output, respectively. ￿, ￿, ￿i
and ￿i;(i = 0;1;2;:::;p) denote the coe¢ cient matrices associated with the constant and the
endogenous variables in the structural and reduced form VAR models, respectively. Finally,
p denotes the lag length.
The structural form VAR(p) regression equation can be written as:
￿0yt = ￿ + ￿1yt￿1 + ￿2yt￿2 + ::: + ￿pyt￿p + ut (6)
where ut ￿ N(0;￿u) denote the structural form innovations.
5Estimation results for the bivariate VAR model are robust to the choice of oil price speci￿cation. All
estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
6Following the empirical literature on oil prices, we use accumulated responses since the response of
aggregate output exhibits an oscillating pattern.
7NOPI variable, by design, ￿lters out gradual increases and is intended to capture only large changes in
oil prices. Insigni￿cant impact of NOPI variable is not surprising given the lack of abrupt oil price changes
in our sample
8The initial 107 months cover the 1991:2 - 1999:12 period.
4The reduced form VAR(p) can then be written as:
yt = ￿ + ￿1yt￿1 + ￿2yt￿2 + ::: + ￿pyt￿p + "t (7)
where ￿i = ￿
￿1
0 ￿i, ￿ = ￿
￿1
0 ￿ and "t ￿ N(0;￿e) denote the reduced from innovations and
relate to the structural shocks through "t = ￿
￿1





Next we discuss how we impose short-term restrictions on ￿
￿1
0 and estimate the SVAR.
We ￿rst consider real oil prices. Although there is an ongoing controversy about the
source of oil price changes, the orthodox point of view regard oil price changes as a result of
supply-side, rather than demand-side reasons. Accordingly, we assume that oil price is not
in￿ uenced by other variables in the system contemporaneously. In other words, shocks on
global liquidity conditions and Turkish interest rates and real output do not a⁄ect oil prices in
the same month. Since Turkey is a small open economy, the assumption that oil price changes
are contemporaneously una⁄ected by Turkey￿ s interest rate and real aggregate output can
be considered as appropriate. Hence, the structural and the reduced form innovation terms
are related as follows: ￿ot = b11uot.
As for the Federal Funds Rate variable, FFR, we assume that the Federal Open Market
Committee responds to real oil price changes contemporaneously in order to achieve price
stability and not to the rest of the variables in the system. As before, it is safe to assume
shocks to Turkey￿ s domestic interest rate and real output is not an important determinant
of the unexpected changes to FFR. Hence the FFR innovations could be expressed as: ￿ft =
b21uot + b22uft.
The implied volatility index, VIX, is another important indicator of global liquidity
conditions and is assumed to be a⁄ected by the real oil prices as well as the FFR but not
from other variables in the system contemporaneously. Therefore innovations to the VIX is
assumed to be represented as: ￿vt = b31uot + b32uft + b33uvt.
The domestic interest rate is assumed to respond to changes in real oil prices and global
liquidity conditions contemporaneously. We assume that the Central Bank of Turkey, due
to fear of price increases would respond to an increase in the oil prices and a deterioration in
the global liquidity conditions to the extent that it a⁄ects domestic prices through exchange
rate pass through. We also assume that since output is observed with a lag, Central Bank
of Turkey and hence the policy rate is contemporaneously not a⁄ected by real output shocks
and may respond with a lag. Hence, the interest rate equation could be expressed as:
￿it = b41uot + b42uft + b43uvt + b44uit
The ￿nal variable in the system which is the real output of Turkey is assumed to be
contemporaneously related to Federal Funds Rate, implied volatility index, and domestic
interest rate, but not the real oil price changes. The rationale for this assumption is that
the actualization supply-side e⁄ects of oil price changes is a timely process, the production
decision changes due to changing input costs does not take place contemporaneously but
with a lag.9 Therefore the innovation terms of the real output equation is assumed to take
the form: ￿yt = b52uft + b53uvt + b54uit + b55uyt
9Previous empirical studies using quarterly data assume a contemporaneous relation between output and
5Combining these 5 equations, the relationship between reduced and structural form in-
novations may be written as:
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where "ot, "ft, "vt,"it, "yt are the reduced form; uot, uft, uvt, uit, uyt are the structural form
innovation terms of real oil price, FFR, VIX, Turkey￿ s domestic interest rate and real GDP,
respectively.10
Similar to the bivariate VAR, log-likelihood criterion,indicated the optimal length to be
13. We present the accumulated response of aggregate output from the SVAR model for
the full sample in Figure 5. In contrast to the results obtained from the bivariate VARs,
the accumulated response of real GDP to real oil price shocks is negative and signi￿cant
and does not die o⁄ until 8 months after the shock. Other than the direct response of real
output to oil shocks, two other variables response are worth noting. The responses of both
the Federal Funds Rate and the Turkey￿ s overnight interbank rate to oil price impulses are
positive and signi￿cant. This ￿nding is similar to previously reported empirical results, and
may be attributed to two major reasons: First, at macro level, central banks respond to oil
price shocks and increase interest rates in order to suppress in￿ ationary pressure. Second,
at micro level, agents who believe that the shocks could be temporary are inclined to borrow
funds to smooth their consumption, which cause a rise in interest rates.
When the sample period is divided with respect to the year 2000, the accumulated re-
sponses of aggregate output to oil price shocks derived from SVAR are found to be negative
and signi￿cant in both periods, as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. While the signi￿cance
and magnitude of the responses are more stable and powerful up to 2000, in contrast to
Blanchard and Gal￿￿ s (2007) ￿ndings, real output responds negative and signi￿cantly to real
oil price increases even in the post-2000 period.
We also derived the time-varying accumulated response of real GDP to an oil price shock
for the multivariate SVAR framework, and presented the results in Figure 8. We found that
the behavior of real output responds relatively stable over time, with the exception of the
￿nancial crisis years of 1994 and 2001. Furthermore, in contrast to Blanchard and Gal￿￿ s
(2007) ￿ndings, the magnitude of the real output response to an oil price shock is found
to be gradually increasing in absolute value. This essentially implies that when the global
liquidity conditions and the domestic interest rates are accounted for, the negative and sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect of oil prices on real output persist even in the post 2000 period.
oil prices. However, we use monthly data and such an assumption would be erroneous. Nevertheless, our
results are robust to this speci￿cation.
10Our ￿ndings are robust with respect to the use of other short-term restrictions, including Cholesky
recursive factorization.
64. Conclusions
In this study, we investigated e⁄ects of energy price changes on aggregate economic
activity of Turkey, empirically. Turkey, a small open economy, di⁄ers from the previously
empirically investigated countries since she cannot in￿ uence world oil demand and/or supply,
and prices accordingly. Following the ￿nancial account liberalization of Turkey since end-
1990s, we incorporated the ￿nancial and global liquidity conditions into the model. We
report that when the global liquidity conditions are excluded, the accumulated response of
real output to oil price innovations are found to be statistically insigni￿cant in the post-
2000 period. However, with the global conditions, the negative and signi￿cant impact of oil
price shocks persist. Further, we document that both the Fed funds rate and the Turkish
overnight interest rate respond positively to oil price increases and that there is no signi￿cant
relationship between oil price changes and the implied volatility index. We conclude that
the inclusion of the global liquidity conditions in the relation between aggregate economic
activity and oil price changes is an important issue for a small open economy such as Turkey.
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Accumulated Response of Real GDP to
One Standard Deviation Structural Brent Price Innovation
(Including Global Liquidity Variables)
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